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Abstract
Current development platforms are web scale, unlike recent platforms which were just
network scale. There has been a rapid evolution in computing paradigm that has created the
need for data storage as agile and scalable as the applications they support. Relational
databases with their joins and locks influence performance in web scale systems negatively.
Thus, various types of non-relational databases have emerged in recent years, commonly
referred to as NoSQL databases. To fulfill the gaps created by their relational counter-part,
they trade consistency and security for performance and scalability. With NoSQL databases
being adopted by an increasing number of organizations, the provision of security for them
has become a growing concern.
This research presents a context based abstract model by extending traditional role based
access control for access control in NoSQL databases. The said model evaluates and executes
security policies which contain versatile access conditions against the dynamic nature of
data. The goal is to devise a mechanism for a forward looking, assertive yet flexible security
feature to regulate access to data in the database system that is devoid of rigid structures and
consistency, namely a document based database such as MongoDB.
.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

The IT industry has come a long way since Web 2.0 when the nature of computing
started to shift from standalone software to a distributed service model and network
models replaced the internet as a development platform with desktop applications
migrating to cloud services. Since then it has been a constant race to develop the next
best computing concept to serve the ever-growing data mass, ever-evolving traffic
patterns, and constant high demand for performance. The market share of relational
database management systems (RDMBSs) is still the largest when it comes to storing
application data consistently regardless of the nature of the data or application. But the
nature and size of data is emerging as the major factor when designing an application
today.
Applications now run distributed over many servers, they get dynamically scaled on
demand and even the delivery model has been enjoying new approaches with the Cloud.
In contrast, RDMBSs have gotten less attention in terms of new approaches and as a
result are becoming a less obvious choice as data storage. To fill this gap, new types of
databases (DBs) have emerged called NoSQL (Not Only SQL) databases. These new

databases come equipped with horizontal scaling, high availability, low cost, and high
performance.
NoSQL databases present new storage architectures that are favorable to unrestrained
growth of data and traffic. These databases facilitate devising parallel algorithms (i.e.
MapReduce) designed to efficiently process the distributed data. The advent of NoSQL is
leading the approaches and methods of storing and analyzing information rich user data
to a brand new dimension. NoSQL exercises least amount of control over data where its
relational counterpart maintains rigid control over the structure and occurrence of data.
Relational systems use metadata to precisely control data type and heavily synchronized
processes to maintain data integrity. NoSQL uses loosely synchronized processes to
scatter data across many systems with little to no maintenance of consistency or integrity
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constraints but at the same time it provides almost no support for security at the database
level.
The main promoters of NoSQL databases are Web 2.0 companies such as Amazon,
Twitter, LinkedIn and Google which are challenged with unprecedented data, operation
volumes under tight latency constraints and massive infrastructure needs. NoSQL
databases represent the much needed data storage evolution in enterprise application
architecture, continuing the evolution of the past twenty years. In the 1990’s, vertically
integrated applications gave way to client-server architecture, and with Web 2.0, clientserver architecture transcended to three-tier web application architecture. In parallel, the
demands of web-scale data analysis added map-reduce processing into the mix and data
scientists started trading transactional consistency for incremental scalability and largescale distribution. The NoSQL movement emerged out of the later constellation [34].
Martin Fowler [24] states that NoSQL is an accidental neologism. NoSQL is an
observation and aggregation of common characteristics, lacking any prescriptive
definition. The evolution in data storage was motivated by the need to support large
volumes of data with database running on clusters. Relational databases are not designed
to run efficiently on clusters. Fowler aggregates the following common characteristics of
NoSQL databases in his book.
•
•
•
•
•

Not using the relational model
Running well on clusters
Open-source
Built for 21st century web estates
Schemaless

NoSQL, “Not Only SQL”, is not a replacement for relational databases. These databases
are developed to run on clusters consisting of commodity computers and therefore are
designed to be distributed and failure tolerant. To achieve this, database architects have to
step away from the ACID properties and make different trade-offs with transaction
management, query capabilities and performance. NoSQL databases are usually designed
to fit the requirements of most web services; most of them are schema-less systems that
allow users to change data attributes at run time and bring their own query languages.
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The NoSQL security model is for the databases to be buried deep within an organization
and behind other systems. The security model expects the database to reside in a secure
environment, protected by firewalls. The irony is that it’s the web applications or social
media applications which have adopted the NoSQL databases and have made it popular.
Having an open front end, universally accessible from any web browser makes
development easier, but the open user-interface concept conflicts with the behind-closeddoor security model. This security concern is the main driving force in this thesis.
Access control is a fundamental security technique in systems in which multiple users
share access to common resources. It is the process of stating and enforcing security
policies that determine whether a subject (e.g., process, computer, user, etc.) is allowed to
perform an operation (e.g., read, write, update, delete, etc.) on an object (e.g., a tuple in a
database, a table, a file, a service, etc.). This mechanism maintains the subject's
permissions (rights to carry out an operation on an object) in a system in order to achieve
the desired level of security.
There are several access control models. Among those, role based accesses control
(RBAC) models are most widely mentioned as they provide systematic access control
security for Enterprise solutions. One of the main advantages of RBAC over other access
control models is the ease of its security administration [6]. RBAC enables an
organization to model its security mechanism to closely match the individual business
process. RBAC models are policy neutral [26]; they can support different authorization
policies, including mandatory and discretionary policies, through the appropriate role
configuration.
The recent paradigm shift in application architectures such as cloud computing,
distributed file system and non-structured data store imposes novel challenges for
authorization that are not addressed by the well-established RBAC models [9].
Researchers have proposed several RBAC extensions to address an ever increasing scope
of security requirements [2, 18, 32, 6, 10, 29, 23, 21, 21]. Most of these extensions are
conceived for a particular system or business process. These approaches come up short
when a different system comes into concern.
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The increasing popularity of NoSQL databases and the large volume of user related
sensitive information stored in these databases raises the concern for the confidentiality
and privacy of the data and the security provided by these systems. NoSQL data models
are flexible and can be designed according to application need or context. A context can
be used to define the parameters for which an operation can be executed in a system.
Context typically is application dependent. Usually, RBAC components are limited to
user, role, permission and constraint. The classic RBAC model cannot support enforcing
a security policy for contextual information such as state of data or application interface,
let alone an unstructured data model such as seen in NoSQL. In this thesis we use one of
the RBAC extensions to define an abstract security model for a specific NoSQL database
type, a Document Database.
We start with a brief overview of NoSQL and RBAC. Then in Chapter 4, we discuss the
architecture and security concerns of one of the popular document databases. Based on
this discussion we present an abstract model in Chapter 5. The rest of the thesis is
organized as follows. Chapter 6 contains the evaluation of the model against a sample
internal enterprise system where traditional RBAC fails. We investigate the authorization
requirements imposed by this system in this chapter. Chapter 7 contains conclusions and
Future work. Comparison of SQL with NoSQL databases is given in Appendix A.

5

Chapter 2

2

Basics of NoSQL Databases

The intent of this chapter is to discuss common concepts, techniques and patterns related
to NoSQL databases along with several classes of NoSQL and an individual NoSQL
product. In recent years a number of NoSQL databases have been developed mainly by
practitioners and web companies to fit their specific requirements regarding scalability
performance, maintenance and feature-set. Some of these databases are conceived from
the idea of Google BigTable or Amazon’s Dynamo or a combination of both. Because of
the variety of these approaches and the overlaps regarding the nonfunctional
requirements and the feature-set, it could be difficult to get and maintain an overview of
the non-relational databases. So there have been various approaches to classify NoSQL
databases, each with different categories and subcategories.

2.1 NoSQL: Classifications
In his presentation “NoSQL is a Horseless Carriage” [33], Yen suggests a taxonomy that
can be found in Table 1.
Table 1: Classifications – NoSQL Taxonomy by Stephen Yen [33]
Term
key‐value‐cache

Key-Value-Store

Eventually-Consistent
Key-Value-Store

Database
Memcached
Repcached
Coherence
Infinispan
EXtreme Scale
Jboss Cache
Velocity
Terracoqa
keyspace
Flare
Schema Free
RAMCloud
Dynamo
Voldemort
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Ordered-Key-ValueStore

Data-Structures Server
Tuple Store

Object Database

Document Store

Wide Columnar Store

Dynomite
SubRecord
Mo8onDb
Dovetaildb
Tokyo Tyrant
Lightcloud
NMDB
Luxio
MemcacheDB
Actord
Redis
Gigaspaces
Coord
Apache River
ZopeDB
DB4O
Shoal
CouchDB
Mongo
Jackrabbit
XML Databases
ThruDB
CloudKit
Perservere
Riak Basho
Scalaris
Bigtable
Hbase
Cassandra
Hypertable
KAI
OpenNeptune
Qbase
KDI

Similarly to the classifications mentioned above, Rick Cattel classifies different NoSQL
databases based on their data model [5] as shown in Table 2.
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Table 2: Classifications – Categorization by Rick Cattell [5]
Category
Key-value Stores

Database
Redis
Scalaris
Tokyo Tyrant
Voldemort
Riak
SimpleDB
CouchDB
MongoDB
Terrastore
Bigtable
HBase
HyperTable
Cassandra

Document Stores

Extensible Record
Stores

In his presentation [28] at codemesh 2010, Ben Scofield of Viget Labs gave generic
introduction to NoSQL databases along with a categorization of different NoSQL
databases. The presentation contained a short comparison of classes of NoSQL databases
by nonfunctional categories as well as ratings of their feature coverage. Popescu [22]
summarizes Scofield’s ideas in his blog as presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Classifications – Categorization and Comparison by Scofield and Popescu
[22, 28]
Performance

Scalability

Flexibility Complexity

Functionality

Key-Value Stores high

high

high

None

Variable (none)

Column stores

high

high

moderate

low

minimal

Document
stores
Graph databases

high

high

low

variable (low)

variable

variable
(high)
variable

high

high

graph theory

Relational
databases

variable

variable

low

moderate

relational
algebra

The classification used for the purpose of this thesis is Document Store.
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2.2 NoSQL: Principle concept
This section gives an overview of some basic concepts in the NoSQL design model. The
CAP (consistency, availability and partition tolerance) theorem introduced by Eric
Brewer [4], refers to the three properties of shared-data systems namely data consistency,
system availability and tolerance to network partitions. This concept is widely adopted by
prominent Cloud vendors as well as the NoSQL faction. This theorem basically states
that current databases are better at consistency than availability and wide-area databases
can’t have both but this favors the side of NoSQL and influenced the design of nonrelational databases.
Brewer mentions a tradeoff between ACID and BASE systems and proposed to select
one or the other for individual use-cases: if a system or parts of a system have to be
consistent and partition-tolerant, ACID properties are required and if availability and
partition-tolerance are favored over consistency, the resulting system (i.e. NoSQL) can be
characterized by the BASE properties. ACID database (RDBMS) is transaction based and
it leverages data consistency and persistence principles from developers’ responsibility.
ACID transactions provide the following assurances:
Atomicity: All of the operations in the transaction will complete, or none will.
Consistency: The database will be in a consistent state when the transaction begins and
ends.
Isolation: The transaction will behave as if it is the only operation being performed upon
the database.
Durability: Upon completion of the transaction, the operation will not be reversed. [9]
The BASE approach, according to Brewer, forfeits the ACID properties of consistency
and isolation in favor of “availability, graceful degradation, and performance” [4]. The
acronym BASE is composed of the following characteristics: Basically Available, Softstate, Eventual consistency.
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Brewer contrasts ACID with BASE as illustrated in Table 4, yet considers the two
concepts as a spectrum instead of alternatives excluding each other. So an application
works basically all the time (basically available), does not have to be consistent all the
time (soft-state) but will be in some known-state state eventually [14].

Table 4: ACID vs. BASE [4]
ACID
Strong consistency
Isolation
Focus on “commit”
Nested transactions
Availability?
Conservative (pessimistic)
Difficult evolution (e. g. schema)

BASE
Weak consistency – stale data OK
Availability first
Best effort
Approximate answers OK
Aggressive (optimistic)
Simpler!
Faster
Easier evolution

2.3 NoSQL: Challenges
NoSQL database system takes a step away from the ACID principle of the relational
database to ensure either partition or availability. According to Brewer’s [4] CAP
theorem, a distributed database system will either trade availability to make sure the
database is consistent or it can favor availability over consistency when the database is
partitioned; but neither at the same time. This implies that if consistency and availability
are of primary concerns then it is achieved by not introducing partition in the database
system. Most of the NoSQL databases give priority to availability over consistency.
NoSQL databases are not mature enough compared to RDBMS and thus face several
challenges and concerns. One of the hurdles the application designers face is overhead
and complexity created by the different query processing language or API in each
NoSQL database in place of SQL. Each NoSQL database has different API and different
query systems, requiring a full learning curve for developers every time a new NoSQL
database is introduced. NoSQL databases are introduced to leverage large volumes of
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data with simpler operations on them. As a result complex query programming for the
databases can be often difficult. NoSQL databases are used primarily for specialized
projects, such as those that are distributed, that involve large amounts of data, or that
must scale. Lack of common query language, consistency support and transaction system
create impedance towards the adoption of NoSQL databases in certain types of business
applications like banking systems. RDBMSs are equipped with query optimization
engine because relational models ensure data independence and provide high level
support of ad-hoc query. But in NoSQL databases, the query needs to be implicitly
optimized during design time based on the particular architecture of the database itself,
the application nature and patterns of queries in the system. From this point of view
application designers and architects need to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of each
available NoSQL systems before its adoption and development. Lack of proper system
and management tools or lack of a proper theoretical foundation can make developing a
methodology for database design quite challenging.
A NoSQL database is not to be thought as a replacement for relational databases but
instead a better option for certain types of business. Instead of one model for all, we need
to look at the data and choose databases accordingly. The relational databases in use
today are established and mature tools with large industry and theoretical foundations.
But applications have different needs.

2.4 NoSQL: Type example
Although there are many classifications, two main classifications have gained the most
popularity – Key-value-stores and Document databases. Key-value-stores have a simple
data model in common: data is stored in unstructured records consisting of a key and the
values associated with that record. It is also called a Row Store because all of the data for
a single record is stored together, in something that we can think of conceptually as a row
in relational model.
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Document databases are more complex than a simple key-value-stores and model more
meaningful data structures as they at least allow encapsulating key-value-pairs in a
logical definition. This classification of NoSQL stores each record and its associated data
in a concept called a “document” without any strict schema, thus eliminating the need of
schema migration efforts [36]. Everything related to a database object is encapsulated
together. Storing data in this way has the following advantages:
-

Documents are independent units which makes performance better (related data is
read contiguously off disk) and makes it easier to distribute data across multiple
servers while preserving its locality.

-

Application logic is easier to write. A document database basically stores data in
bulk thus eliminates any need of having logic in data or its queries like SQL. This
provides developers with full freedom to implement any business logic as the
need to translate the queries from application to database is absent.

-

Unstructured data can be stored easily, since a document contains whatever keys
and values the application logic requires. In addition, costly migrations are
avoided since the database does not need to know its information schema in
advance. [37]

2.4.1

MongoDB

MongoDB is a schema-free document database written in C++ and developed in an opensource project by the company 10gen Inc. [36]. According to its developers, the main
goal of MongoDB is to close the gap between the fast and highly scalable key-valuestores and feature-rich traditional RDBMSs.

2.4.1.1

Databases and Collections

MongoDB databases reside on a MongoDB server that can host more than one of such
databases which are independent and stored separately by the MongoDB server. A
database contains one or more collections consisting of documents. Collections inside
databases are referred to by the MongoDB manual as “named groupings of documents”.
Data in MongoDB has a ﬂexible schema. Unlike SQL databases, where one must
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determine and declare a table’s schema before inserting data, MongoDB collections do
not enforce document structure. This ﬂexibility facilitates the mapping of documents to
an entity or an object. Once the first document is inserted into a database, a collection is
created automatically and the inserted document is added to this collection. Such an
implicitly created collection gets configured with default parameters by MongoDB [35,
36].
MongoDB allows organizing collections in hierarchical namespaces using a dot-notation,
e. g. the collections agency.campaign, agency.product and agency.report residing under
the namespace agency. The MongoDB manual notes that “this is simply an
organizational mechanism for the user. The collection namespace is flat from the
database’s perspective”. ObjectId or $oid, a special 12-byte BSON type guarantees
uniqueness within the collection. The ObjectId is generated based on timestamp, machine
ID, process ID, and a process-local incremental counter. MongoDB uses ObjectId values
as the default values for _id fields. Appendix A lists comparison of MongoDB with SQL
in terms and concept.

2.4.1.2

Documents

The key decision in designing data models for MongoDB applications revolves around
the structure of documents and how the application represents relationships between data.
A document in MongoDB is a data structure comparable to an XML document, a Python
dictionary, a Ruby hash or a JSON document. In fact, MongoDB persists documents by a
format called BSON which is very similar to JSON but in a binary representation for
reasons of efficiency and because of additional data types compared to JSON.
Nonetheless, “BSON maps readily to and from JSON and also to various data structures
in many programming languages” [35]. The following tables show the encapsulation of
objects in document and collections –
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{_id: <ObjectId1>,
username: “123xyz”,
address: “127.0.0.1”}
db.< collection >. find ( { username: “123xyz” } );
db.< collection >. save ( { ... } );
Figure 1: MongoDB data model [35]
There are two ways that allow applications to model their data in documents: references
and embedded documents. With MongoDB, related data can be embedded in a single
structure or document. This approach is generally known as “denormalized” models.
Normalized data models on the other hand, describe relationships between related data
using references between documents. These two approaches create interesting
consequences while designing a security model on the context of data. Figures 1and 2
illustrate the approaches.

Figure 2: Data model with embedded fields that contain all related information [35].
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The MongoDB manual gives some guidance when to reference an object and when to
embed it as follows [36]Criteria for Object References –
-

First-class domain objects (typically residing in a separate collection)

-

Many-to-many reference between objects

-

Objects of this type are often queried in large numbers (request all / the first n
objects of a certain type)

-

The object is large (multiple megabytes)

Figure 3: Data model using references to link documents. Both the contact
document and the access document contain a reference to the user document [35].
Criteria for Object Embedding –
-

'Many' objects always appear with ( i.e. viewed in the context of) detail properties

-

Aggregation relationship between object and host object
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-

Object is not referenced by another object

-

Performance to request and operate on the object and its host-object is crucial.

MongoDB developers claim that Embedding is like pre-joined data or single table
inheritance. It can be seen as One-to-One Relationships. "Belongs to" relationships are
often embedded that provide a holistic representation of entities with their embedded
attributes and relationships [38].

2.4.1.3

Query and API

MongoDB has its own ad-hoc query language named Mongo Query Language. It is a
JSON-like query language which is basically parameterized function calls using a variety
of query operators (Comparison, Logical, Evaluation, Geospatial, etc.) with names that
begin with a $ character. To retrieve certain documents from a database collection, a
query document is created containing the field conditions to match and then returns a
cursor. The cursor is iterated to access the resulting document. By default, the server
automatically closes a cursor after 10 minutes of inactivity or if client has exhausted the
cursor. To specify equality condition, a query document will have a form as { <field>:
<value> } to select all documents that contain the <field> with the specified <value>. In
MongoDB, the _id field is always included in results unless explicitly excluded. The
following example selects all documents in a fiction collection where the value of the
genre field is either 'Thriller' or 'Sci-Fi':
db.fiction.find( { genre: { $in: [ 'Thriller', 'Sci-Fi' ] } } );
The MongoDB server returns the query results in chunks. Chunk size does not exceed
4194304 bytes which is the maximum BSON document size. For most queries, the first
chunk contains 101 documents or just enough documents to exceed 1 megabyte.
Subsequent chunks are of 4 megabytes in size. For queries that include a sort operation
without an index, the server loads all the documents in memory to perform the sort and
returns all documents in the first batch [35].
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MongoDB uses a RESTful API. REST (Representational State Transfer) is an
architecture style for designing applications that run on a network platform. Its
foundation is a stateless, client-server, cacheable communications protocol (e.g., the
HTTP protocol). RESTful applications use HTTP requests to post, read data and delete
data. The REST API of MongoDB provides additional information and write-access on
top of the HTTP status interface. While the REST API does not provide any support for
insert, update, or remove operations, it does provide administrative access, and its
accessibility represents vulnerability in a secure environment.

2.4.2

MongoDB: Security Concerns

Security was not a primary concern of MongoDB designers. As a result there are quite a
few security concerns in its design. MongoDB and other NoSQL databases are still very
new in the field with respect to their feature set, especially with the respect to security, so
fine-grained permissions or access control in these systems are yet to be provided. Based
on this MongoDB or NoSQL databases in general lose in an adoptability study for large
mission critical enterprises. Often developers need to devise scopes to maximizes its
advantages and minimize its weaknesses.
The relational model takes data and organizes it into many interrelated tables that contain
rows and columns. Tables reference each other through reference constraints that are
stored in columns as well. When querying the data, the desired information gets
collected from multiple tables, sometimes creating logical entities as ‘views’ having its
own set of security constraints. In contrast to that, a NoSQL database i.e. MongoDB
stores and aggregates data into documents using the JSON format. Each JSON document
can be thought of as an object to be used by the application. A JSON document might, for
example, take all the data stored in a row that spans several tables of a relational database
and aggregate it into a single document. Aggregating this information may lead to
duplication of information, but since storage is no longer cost prohibitive, the resulting
data model flexibility, ease of efficiently distributing the resulting documents and read
and write performance improvements make it an easy trade-off for web-based
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applications. As MongoDB databases (like other NoSQL databases) do not have strictly
defined database schemas, using JavaScript for query syntax allows developers to write
arbitrarily complex queries against irrelevant document structures.
Let’s say we have a MongoDB collection that contains some documents representing
books, some documents representing movies, and some documents representing music
albums. The following JavaScript query function will select all the documents in the
specified collection that were written, filmed, or recorded in the specified year:
function() {
var search_year = input_value;
return this.publicationYear == search_year ||
this.filmingYear == search_year ||
this.recordingYear == search_year;
}

The statement in an application might look like this:
$query = 'function() {var search_year = \'' .$_GET['year'] . '\';' . As most NoSQL database
communicates to the server over the HTTP protocol, this function call from an
application reads the year from the address of a web browser and can expose an entire
database collection due to any ill intended request.
This illustrates that NoSQL database engines that process JavaScript (it is an interpreted
language) containing user-specified parameters can be vulnerable to injection attacks.
MongoDB, for example, supports the use of JavaScript functions for query specifications
and map/reduce operations. Most of the internal commands are actually short JavaScript
routines. JavaScript functions, stored in db.system.js collection, are also available to the
database users. The following statements can all be used in order to perform the same
equivalent query against the database with a where clause:
db.fiction.find( { year : { $gt: 2012 } } );
db.fiction.find( { $where: "this.year>2012" });
db.fiction.find("this. year > 2012");
db.fiction.find( { $where: function() {return this.year > 2012;}});
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In the second and third statements the where clause is passed as a string that might
contain values that were concatenated directly with values passed from the user. In the
fourth statement the query document is passing an entire JavaScript routine to the
database that will be executed against each document in the collection. This cannot be
used to modify the database directly, since the $where function is executed with the
database in read-only mode, however if an application uses this type of where clause
without properly sanitizing the user input, then an injection attack should work against
this form of where clause as well.
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Chapter 3

3

Role Based Access Control

In Chapter 1 we introduced RBAC as one of the access control model candidate. The
basic RBAC model consists of users, roles and permissions. A RBAC enabled system can
enforce enterprise specific security policies, with complex role hierarchy and mutually
exclusive roles. These leverage any manual process of regulating and administrating any
access control management. RBAC can be implemented from very simple to very
complex level depending on the system requirement. A properly-administered RBAC
system enables users to carry out a range of authorized operations, and provides great
flexibility and breadth of application. We mentioned before about RBAC being policy
neutral, but it has the mechanisms to support three important security principles for any
enterprise solution, namely – least privilege, data abstraction and separation of duty.

3.1 Overview
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines RBAC as “Access
control based on user roles (i.e., a collection of access authorizations a user receives
based on an explicit or implicit assumption of a given role). Role permissions may be
inherited through a role hierarchy and typically reflect the permissions needed to perform
defined functions within an organization. A given role may apply to a single individual or
to several individuals.”
The RBAC model has the following principle components [10]:
1. U, R, P which are respectively the sets of users, roles, and permissions
2. UA ⊆ U x R, which is a many-to-many user assignment relation assigning user to
roles.
3. PA ⊆ P x R, which is a many-to-many permission assignment relation assigning
permissions to roles.
4. RH ⊆ P x R is a partial order on R called the role hierarchy.
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5. APA ⊆ AP x AR, a many-to-many permission to administrative role assignment
relation.
6. AUA ⊆ U x AR, a many-to-many user to administrative role assignment relation.
The following logical assertions must hold at any given time by any system using RBAC
[16]:


[ ]

(

[ ]

[ ] ; for any user u associated

with subject s, a role r belongs to the set of authorized role R[s] if and only if u is
authorized for r.


[
[ ]

]

A[s] is the set of active roles for subject s. A subject can obtain a

privilege only if the subject has been assigned an active role.


[ ]

[ ]; a subject can only activate roles (A[s]) from its

authorized role set (R[s])


[

]

[ ]

[ ]; A subject can execute a

privilege only if the privilege is authorized for an active role for the subject.
Along with these there is the concept of session in RBAC. A user may log into different
sessions with different roles that he/she is member of. For example, in one session a user
may be logged in as a creative officer and in another as a regional approver.

3.1.1

RBAC associations

The entities in RBAC are logically connected to each other. The base RBAC model is
equipped with important association mechanisms. Basic RBAC relations are:
-Users are associated with roles.
-Roles are associated with permissions.
-A user has permission only if the user has an authorized role which is associated with
that permission.
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3.1.1.1

Permission to role association (PA)

Each role is associated with multiple permissions. These permissions define the privilege
to carry out particular operations in a system on particular resources. For example, a role
could grant a read permission to all executives, but an approve permission can only be
granted to a supervisor role. Role associations can be easily updated when new
permissions are introduced and roles can be deleted as organizational functions change
and evolve.

3.1.1.2

User to role association (UA)

Under the RBAC framework, users are granted membership into roles based on the
organizational structure. The operations that a user is permitted to perform are based on
the user's role. User membership in roles can be revoked easily and new memberships
can be created when needed. When a user activates a role, RBAC dictates that the user
cannot be granted more privileges than necessary to perform the operation. This concept
ensures the least privilege requirement [25].
These two associations simplify the administration and management of permissions; roles
can be updated without updating the permissions for every user on an individual basis.
Figure 4 illustrates the different models of RBAC over the years.
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Figure 4: Different RBAC Models
The role hierarchy is introduced in RBAC1. This creates the requirement for separation of
duty. Roles can have overlapping permissions where different roles may execute the
same operations. Users can also have private roles that cannot be shared with other users.
This puts a constraint on the role inheritance. Constraints can be viewed as the most
important entity in the current RBAC model. The presence of constraints in the model
facilitates the expression of higher level security policy for organizations. For example, a
constraint can be applied when a security system has two mutually disjoint roles and
users cannot be permitted to gain membership in both roles. We discuss about constraint
in detail in the following section.

3.1.2

Constraints

Constraints have been introduced in RBAC2. Even though conflict of interest in the role
concept was introduced first, real world applications demand more practical and flexible
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solution. The concept of conflicting permissions addresses conflict in terms of
permissions rather than roles. Defining conflict in terms of permissions ensures more fine
grained security than defining it in terms of roles. Conflict defined in terms of roles
allows provision of assigning conflicting permissions to the same role. But conflict
defined in terms of permissions eliminates this security gap [1]. Sandhu states in his
paper about RBAC models that the constraints in the user assignment relation have
counterparts in the privilege assignment relation [21]. The first of these constraints is the
mutually exclusive role. A mutual exclusion constraint is enforced on the assignment of
users to roles to avoid conflict of interest or possible fraud. When two roles are defined as
mutually exclusive, in terms of user to role association, it enforces that a user cannot
belong to both the roles and in terms of permission to role assignment, it enforces that the
same permission cannot be assigned to both roles. This constraint on PA restricts
execution of probable malicious operations. The mutual exclusion constraint facilitates
convenient role administration and decentralization without compromising any possible
organizational security policy. There are two classifications of role exclusion:
authorization time and runtime. They can be defined as:
Authorization time [16]:
[]

[]

This implies that if two roles i, j are mutually exclusive, a user u can obtain one of i, j if
only the user doesn’t belong to the set of users authorized for the other role (M[i] or
M[j]).
Runtime [16]:
[ ]
[ ]

[]

[]

[ ]

This is a less restrictive constraint. This basically lets a user to be authorized for both the
mutually exclusive roles (E) but puts restriction by the condition that only one role can be
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activated at a time. This weakness in constraint is addressed by the security principle of
least privilege role set.

3.1.3

Security principles

Mutual exclusion constraint specifies several security principles to be ensured in RBAC.
Separation of duty and least privilege are not entities of RBAC but rather the RBAC
model supports development of such framework. Least privilege grants only the
necessary rights to complete a task and separation of duty places restrictions on
assignment of disjoint roles and permissions.

3.1.3.1

Least privilege

The principle of least privilege requires that any module in a computer abstraction layer
can only have access to information or privilege, pertaining to the purpose it’s supposed
to satisfy. This is a key design concept for protection of data and related logic. Cholewka
et. al. [7] present strict least privilege as a mechanism to solidify the security concern
around the privilege set available for a subject. According to them it distinguishes
between a person’s job and the tasks that a person must fulfill as part of his job. Strict
least privilege thus signifies the requirement of providing the user with just the
permissions to perform any steps of a workflow activity at any given time.

3.1.3.2

Separation of duties

One of the important advantages of using RBAC is that it provides enough granular
control that system administrators can implement proper separation of duties (SoD) in
any targeted applications. SoD is a classic security principle concerning conflict of
interest, the appearance of conflict of interest, wrongful acts, fraud, abuse and errors. A
crucial aspect of security is to separate permission in such a way that users cannot abuse
their privileges in order to execute or hide nonconforming activity. Proper separation of
duty requires that users cannot have conflicting responsibilities or be responsible for
reporting on themselves or their senior positions. Separation of duty requirements are
often formulated as business rules such as “a person may not approve his own travel
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allowance” or “any bank cheque requires two different signatures”. NIST explains SoD
the following way:
“RBAC is . . . well suited to separation-of-duty requirements, where no single individual
has all permissions needed for critical operations such as expenditure of funds. Proper
operation of RBAC requires that roles fall under a single administrative domain or have a
consistent definition across multiple domains, so distributed applications might be
challenging” [17].
Separation of duty can be interpreted in various forms but the two main concepts in the
implementation are strong exclusion or static separation of duty (SSD) and weak
exclusion or dynamic separation of duty (DSD). Static separation of duty is the simplest
form of SoD; it defines role memberships that are mutually exclusive, and thus the
conflicting roles cannot both be in UA for a given user.
Dynamic Separation of Duties states that the same person can activate the purchasing role
and the approving role, but they cannot approve their own purchase. In the SSD model, a
user may not be members of both roles. In the DSD model, a user could be a member of
both roles, but could not function in both capacities for the same linked transactions.
The above two classifications of SoD address the issue of when an exclusion can be
enforced. This is not flexible enough in many business models while implementing
RBAC. The need to associate privileges of mutual exclusive roles to other nonexclusive
roles creates additional complexity. Kuhn [16] addressed the issue of how and which
privileges can be shared with mutual exclusion of roles and other roles by introducing
additional variety in mutual exclusion. In his paper, privileges in mutually exclusive roles
can be characterized as disjoint, denoted as complete exclusion in permission assignment.
This type of exclusion implies that if two roles i and j are defined to be mutually
exclusive (denoted as the mapping E (i , j)), then a privilege that is assigned to either of i
or j cannot be assigned to any other role k in the RBAC module;
[]
SoD policies [16, 20].

[ ] This rule along with SSD can better enforce
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Another type of exclusion is partial or shared. It says that between two mutually
exclusive roles (E(i , j )), the privilege set cannot be complete equal; at least one privilege
in i must not be in j;

[]

[ ] These two

classifications in Kuhn’s paper [16] along with the two mutual exclusion rules described
in the Section 3.1.2 give us a variety of four SoD relations: authorization-time complete,
runtime complete, authorization-time partial and runtime partial. Authorization-time/
complete exclusion is the safest of the constraints. However, often implementation of
RBAC demands flexibility and then run-time/complete or run-time/shared exclusion can
ensure safety within a single user session.

3.2 Incorporating User Context Information into RBAC
Although RBAC makes an authorization decision based on a user’s role, it is not
sufficiently powerful to enforce rules that are dependent on runtime parameters or
contexts. A context-aware access control enables administrators to specify more precise
and fine-grain authorization polices for any application. Contexts can be information
about a user's current physical location, the devices being used, the network access node,
and current user activity. Additionally, there can be other conditions and characteristics
that may be relevant in defining a context e.g. temporal attributes of an operation to be
performed, geospatial attributes of resources to be accessed.
However, incorporating user context information to control access to a system is
complicated. First, it requires that extracting and embedding context information in a
system meets proper authenticity and integrity requirements. Second, the dynamic nature
of information may require revoking role membership with a change of context
information. This is challenging as it involves dynamic changes to policies during
deployment. A Context-Aware Role-Based Access Control (CA-RBAC) has been
proposed by Kulkarni and Tripathi [18] to support such requirements.
In this model the system sends a context query to one of the context agents for each
access request. The context agents authenticate and validate the data integrity aggregated
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from interfaces. The access control layer is responsible for managing context-based
access to resources based on personalized permissions. The CA-RBAC programming
framework consists of operational layers - context management and access control. The
context management layer is responsible for aggregating data to generate context
information required by any system. Figure 5 shows the composition of the CA-RBAC
model.

Figure 5: Context-Aware RBAC Model (CA-RBAC) [18, Figure 1]

Kulkarni and Tripathi [18] established five key constraints on a system using the context
notion. The constraints are as follows:
1. Role admission and validation constraints: These constraints specify context-based
conditions that need to be satisfied before activating a role for a user, and also for
continuing a user’s membership in a role.
2. Context-based role permissions: Dynamic object binding causes role operations to
interface with different privileges under different context conditions.
3. Personalized role permissions: The operations that are accessible through role
permission may be different for different role members and may depend on the context
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information associated with a role member. In basic RBAC a role permission invoked by
any member of a role is executed on the same object. The CA-RBAC model transcends
the basic model when a permission invoked by different role members needs to be
invoked on different object instances based on each role member’s individual context.
4. Context-based permission activation constraints: These constraints are associated with
specific role permissions, and specify context-based conditions that need to hold for a
role member to execute such permissions.
5. Context-based resource access constraints: These constraints restrict a role member’s
access to a subset of resources that are managed by an active space service.
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Chapter 4

4

Motivation and Objectives

Developers now can turn any sound idea into software with the help of a number of open
source development frameworks and relational databases; add the Cloud into the equation
and developers freely ignore system maintenance, load balancing, scaling, etc. The
elasticity provided by cloud computing enables computational resources to be scaled up
with just seed funding instead of huge capital investments. This agility often makes the
software developers overlook long term effects. The community and collaborative nature
of the current web often makes a service bloom in unprecedented volume. A large
number of users produce a large amount of data. Suddenly, this rapid growth cannot be
contained within the relational database making the new software another start-up
disaster where overloaded database machines and resulting high response times destroy a
previously good user experience.
Modern relational database systems often impair a relatively successful service in the
area of flexibility and scalability. Due to data independence, SQL databases often
disguise a potential expensive operation with its high level interfaces. This can cause a
considerable amount of performance drop when the database grows beyond the planned
scale. This scalability failure and lack of a clear picture of consequences due to data
growth are leading more and more developers towards highly data dependent NoSQL
options. NoSQL database technology offers the flexibility, scalability and performance
that present-day web scale application developers demand.

4.1 Why NoSQL
An agile development cycle facilitates better solutions in terms of meeting real life
scenarios. As real life scenarios rarely follow a fixed set of parameters and end users’
expectations of consumable services change between morning and evening, developers
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are hard pressed to find the next best solutions for applications that can serve almost
without any prerequisite computational parameters. This boundless evolution in service
results in three major trends which are challenging the status quo of traditional databases.
These three trends are the industry favorites – Big data, Big users and Cloud computing.
Organizations are in a constant race in making more and more services available to end
users, to alleviate every aspect of a person’s everyday activities. They are exploring more
and more interfaces for users to connect with. This automatically makes more and more
users converge in the IT frontier and the more users, the bigger the volume of data with
little to no apparent structure. With numerous parties involved, the demand for
meaningful services run seamlessly among interfaces with ever-improved performance in
terms of highly responsive applications allowing more complex processing of data is
constantly raising more and more challenges for IT professionals. These are the driving
forces in the development and adoption of new technologies. One such technology is
NoSQL. NoSQL is becoming a popular alternative to relational databases, especially as
more enterprises recognize that operating at scale is better achieved on clusters of
standard, commodity servers and a flexible data model is often better for the variety and
type of data captured and processed.

4.1.1

Challenges

Big Data refers to the colossal growth in amount, diversity and rate of information being
produced and the bulk of applications that generate, store and process this data. While
this trend represents an incredible opportunity for enterprises across all industries,
delivering on the promise of Big Data is no trivial task. The main challenges in a
database context identified by MongoDB Inc. [41] are:


Data Volumes. In this era of social networks, applications can go viral overnight.
The underlying database is required to support rapid spikes in data volume and
throughput without downtime, without custom adoption and without
compromising performance. Application success depends on flexible and resilient
data systems.
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Real-Time Processing. Ever since the bloom of Web2.0, users expect
applications to behave as if the computational process doesn’t even exist.
Applications more often need to derive knowledge from collected data before
users identify the need for the information. This demands in-place, in real-time
processing of data without moving it to a separate module. The trivial batch
analytics in offline settings are not adequate for today’s service model.
Lightweight real-time analytics should be devised to serve content retroactively,
enable interactivity and improve user experience.



Rapid Evolution. This is a highly competitive market; organizations need to
address changes in business as fast as possible to be able to survive. An agile
development process promises rapid adoption of changes in user demand. One of
the ways is to keep adoption costs light. Schemaless data structures can offer
developers the leverage to keep pace in the race to serve the ever evolving, highly
demanding user group. Whoever satisfies the big user, succeeds.



Flexible Deployment. Requirements for deploying enterprise and consumer
applications have changed radically in only the last few years. As more
organizations engage in real-time interactions with consumers, they measure
response times in milliseconds and downtime means losing money. This demands
flexible replication over multiple data centers. Let it be an internal enterprise
application or a social media application, organizations need to deploy the
application or part of it on their own premises, in the cloud or in hybrid
environments to better utilize the various deployment models. [39]

4.2 Play of NoSQL
Traditional technologies struggle to accommodate the growth, diversity and volume of
data produced in current applications. For example relational databases were designed for
a static data model in which growth of data was controlled and predictable, predefined
queries were in place and the database was normally housed in single server in one data

32

center or even in-house. NoSQL plays a valid alternative in such a context where system
designers have limited control over structure, amount and nature of data.

4.2.1

Schemaless

As discussed before, schemalessness is one of the main reasons for interest in NoSQL
databases. Application developers have been frustrated with the staggering mismatch
between the relational model and the in-memory data structures. More often than not,
developers had to compromise in features or an efficient business model because the
relational database wasn’t sufficiently flexible.
In a relational database a tab le is created with command similar to the followingCreate table module (id int, modulename text, parentmodule int, submodule int)
Then this command to insert data in the above mentioned table fails due to the mismatch
of number of columns to insert as well as the mismatch of the data types: Insert into
module values ( 15,”xyz”, “rty”)
But NoSQL allows one to store any data –

Figure 6: NoSQL Datastore
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Even though relational database can have blobs of unstructured data, it still cannot
translate the business model as seamlessly as a fast response model demands. The query
optimization fails once the data growth surpasses every forecast the developers made.
This massive data is processed in memory and again in the relational database. Even with
a design goal of minimizing to have business rules in the database, relational models have
their own structure to follow, thus limiting how an application can behave.
In NoSQL, developers can treat the database as just a place to dump the data. With
minimum maintenance, this becomes an alternative solution that is sympathetic to users
and thus it is very easy to get business owners to accept. Applications supported by
NoSQL get delivered faster, produce less impedance in any user flow and support
implementation of new modules more efficiently than relational models. At any point in
time an application module can be extended by introducing non uniform types.
Developers can even give users more control over their data by introducing custom fields,
which play less of a role in actual business process but rather they serve in user interface
for convenience. Being schemaless, NoSQL supports these last minute changes in
applications out of the box. But more often than we care to admit, developers get excited
about implementing the module and overlook the security holes presented by the absence
the of relational model’s access control. None of the NoSQL pioneers has a detailed level
security mechanism at place. Often developers will point out that it’s not efficient to
implement a fine grained security mechanism in place for NoSQL as it might feel like
tracing our steps back to the relational model.
Schemaless structures still have an implicit schema. Any code that manipulates the data
needs to make some assumptions about its structure, such as the name of fields. Any data
that doesn't fit this implicit schema will not be manipulated properly, leading to errors. A
class definition defines the logical fields one can use to manipulate it. This is effectively a
schema.
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4.2.2

Schema Migrations

Businesses change hands, merge with other parties even change their service nature. But
information is money and every business wants all their data migrated in the new setup.
From a higher level view, migration seems safer in a relational database. But a relational
database is less tolerant of slight schema changes. It saves every change and puts version
control and more than often complicates the migrated model. In NoSQL on the other
hand there is no schema update, all developers need is to handle the codes handling
implicit schema. Schemaless stores can ease migration, since access code can be defined
to read from either the old structure or the mutated structure. Developers can make the
access codes to gradually migrate old structures to mutated structures. Once the old data
count becomes zero, the overhead becomes obsolete.

4.2.3

Scalability and performance advantages

The data stored in a relational database is rigidly structured by the layout of the tables,
the predesigned relations among these tables and the types of the columns. The need to
scale a relational database can be achieved by running it on more powerful and
specialized servers; organizations often acquire custom-made servers to scale their
relational database. Yet to scale beyond a certain point, the database must be distributed
across multiple servers. Relational databases don’t work inherently in a distributed
manner because joining their tables across multiple machines is expensive. Also,
relational databases aren’t designed to function with data partitioning, so distributing
their functionality is very tedious to achieve. To deal with the increase in concurrent
users (Big Users) and the amount of data (Big Data), applications and their underlying
databases need to scale using one of two choices: scale up or scale out. Scaling up
implies a centralized approach involving servers with larger capacity. Scaling out implies
a distributed approach that leverages many standard, commodity, physical or virtual
servers [19].
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Figure 7: Scale up with relational technology [40]

Scaling up is the natural choice in applications with the relational model as the
underlying data storage. This choice is influenced by the fundamentally centralized,
shared-everything architecture of relational databases. These characteristics of a
relational database make it a less feasible candidate for scaling out. In order to scale out
database administrators have to be really careful about how to create and organize the
schema and structures, know about all the idiosyncrasies involved in a relational database
and these eventually results in making the maintenance and deployment exponentially
more complex and less resilient towards failure. Due to these reasons enterprises would
opt for increasing server capacity in terms of CPU, memory and discs. But this solution is
highly proprietary and increasingly expensive, unlike the low-cost, commodity hardware
typically used so effectively at the web/application server tier [40]. This is illustrated in
Figures 7 and 8: as the number of user increases, for both types of databases, an
application can scale out just by adding more web servers without affecting performance
and causing very little rise in system cost. Whereas in the case of database system, the
RDBMS scales out up to certain point by adding more complex database servers and
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causing a sharp increase in system cost and reduced application performance. The picture
is different when NoSQL is in place; the system cost and application performance curve
is almost the same for application scale out and database scale out.
NoSQL databases have been conceived with the principle target to gain distributed, scale
out databases. They use a cluster of standard, physical or virtual servers to store data and
support database operations. To scale, additional servers are joined to the cluster and the
data and database operations are spread across the larger cluster. Since commodity
servers are expected to fail from time-to-time, NoSQL databases are built to tolerate and
recover from such failure making them highly resilient.

Figure 8: Scale out with NoSQL technology at the database tier [40]
NoSQL uses an easier and linear approach for database scaling. With the increase of
users, NoSQL simply adds new database servers to the cluster when a threshold is met. It
is often part of the database mechanism and thus abstracted away from application layer.
Applications continue to serve the users without any hindrance or downtime. The
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application always sees a single (distributed) system no matter how many replications
have taken place.
A distributed scale out approach is the less expensive between the two alternatives. The
servers to support scaling with required fault tolerance are complex in design and often
are custom made to serve individual business. Also licensing costs of commercial
relational databases end up being really high when used for scaling out, as most of them
provide pricing scheme with single server in the equation. NoSQL databases don’t have
either of the above issues. NoSQL databases are generally open source with priced for
maintenance, runs seamlessly in distributed setting and are relatively inexpensive.
A NoSQL database automatically distributes data across servers, without requiring
applications to participate and influencing the design of data or process. Servers can be
added or removed from the data layer on the go without causing service disruption.
NoSQL databases also support data replication to ensure high availability and support
disaster recovery and sharding to facilitate write-scale. For some NoSQL database (i.e.
MongoDB) the sharding can be programmed so that a load balancer only starts moving
data when a predefined threshold is met. This leverages monitoring and makes the
process easier. Couchbase [40] claims “A properly managed NoSQL database system
should never need to be taken offline, for any reason, supporting 24x365 continuous
operations of applications”.

4.3 Motivation
In the current software industry system architects and developers are tirelessly looking
for ways to deliver software faster. The distinction between what is urgent and what is
important is now becoming a matter of debate. The IT industry is growing faster and
wider, making this horizontal growth urgent while detailed security is the important
aspect and often derived from existing frameworks. While implementing security
measures with traditional frameworks, what developers often do is that they place tweaks
and patches rather than creating a new solution. As a result they often encounter
scenarios where they need to compromise between feature set and over-all security. Still
today the design principle of NoSQL is to give the application developers as much
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freedom in designing the data model as possible. Fast delivery and fast scale out business
model often leave the fine grained security mechanism behind.
NoSQL movement is a lean approach; in many cases it omits or reduces functionality of
data storage for the sake of speed. In simple one user centric applications, this scenario is
acceptable, but when an enterprise solution adopts NoSQL for the sake of scalability and
flexibility, to support the running business models developers often need to reinvent the
wheel especially in case of shared information and at that time access security becomes a
hurdle to cross. It becomes more complicated when this security concern is raised after
the application is deployed and has been in use for a period of time.
The purpose of this thesis is to present an access control mechanism for aiding
application developers in such a case. The database candidate for the purpose is a
Document based NoSQL database while RBAC is chosen as the base access control
mechanism. Normally, RBAC works better with structured data while in NoSQL the
meaning of the same data change depending on operation/user context. Even though the
security concerns discussed in Chapter 2 seem natural, the solutions available are not
standardized. The schemalessness, high fault tolerance and support for non-uniform types
make it complicated to add any security restrictions. As the data model is dynamic, one
can keep on adding attributes to records when the application is being used. So a suitable
approach for a security model in the context of this architecture must have some notion of
forward-looking security. So, understanding what happens with the new attributes that
are introduced to the database and what the privileges should be granted for the new
attributes are challenging. This is a concept that is an aberration and very few have
ventured into it.
In spite of being schemaless and devoid of all the idiosyncrasies of a relational database,
NoSQL databases have options to configure a full array of security capabilities. For
example, in an RDBMS, while inserting, if the data doesn't adhere to the schema, the
insertion will fail automatically. In NoSQL one can choose to trigger on the insertion of a
new record or document rules that have been executed to ensure malformed data is not
being inserted. However one of the big issues is that there are very few users who would
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know how to implement these options now a day when everything has a package or
library. Very few developers start coding from the library level. New users in NoSQL
will likely make big configuration mistakes initially as the available expertise is still
insufficient, thus making a very shallow knowledge pool. Practically everyone is new to
NoSQL; the first thing they care about is to make it work, and everything else can wait a
year or so. Most developers who are attracted to NoSQL also tend to be in startups with
little to no security experience in the first place. In contrast to RDBMS which has
preliminary and basic security in place, NoSQL requires a certain amount of trial and
error to figure out which type of security mechanisms to put in place. Most often,
business simply doesn’t have the time or resources to support it.
The use of NoSQL databases is still dominant in social network applications rather than
enterprise solutions. In most cases, the database tends to sit behind the firewall and it ties
to this application and usually isn't available for other parts of the organization to tap
into. This kind of dependence on perimeter security related to NoSQL is a significant
development impediment for Enterprise solutions where a database collects and
aggregates lots of the business data that need to be accessed through out various in-house
applications. Most NoSQL solutions have very weak authentication and few of them have
a complete concept of how to secure multiple users and their access to the data. Usually if
one has any account one can access the whole data store. This doesn’t stop businesses
from adopting it. Often the available solution is to invest in the best of the developers;
they use veteran programmers because a lot of the security is going to go into the client
software. This also involves allocating additional time buffers in deploy times and
frameworks to avoid any unseen complexities with the new mechanisms in the relatively
new database systems. Even though this model works, it’s counterproductive because,
except for the scaling facilities, this model too takes the same or sometimes more time
and effort than if RDBMS was chosen. Ironically, the advances in database application
security in recent years have very little to do with databases themselves. Popular
programming platforms are now better equipped with features to create fool proof and
secured access models for almost any sort of database.
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The above discussion summarizes the goals for this research as follows:
Goal 1: To provide application developers an easy to adopt security module without
compromising their freedom to design realistic applications.
Goal 2: To leverage security feature for multi tenancy. Even though it is lot cheaper to
simply create new ‘boxes’ for new clients of the same service, it is not efficient. So the
goal is to leverage the security from each box to a central node.
Goal 3: Serve light weight security features while letting an application module to create
branches at run time.

4.4 A target example
To illustrate the access control mechanism for a document based NoSQL database, let us
consider a reporting system on a data warehouse for a globalized agency solution. A 3tier web solution collects numerous data from agency personnel, their clients and end
users with a goal of optimizing marketing operations, simplifying the organization to
enhance global brand governance, reduce the time to market and lower overall cost. A
data warehouse periodically collects a large amount of various forms of data from a
number of interfaces and number of business solutions which are all part of a main
system.
Data from marketing campaigns all over the world, resource metadata from design
houses, multiple brand governance, campaign briefing, client and agency budgets as well
as certain a degree of personal information of all parties get dumped in the data
warehouse. This massive repository of seemingly unintelligent data is open inside the
agency. People from simple desktop publishing, planning, creative design, legal,
marketing to regional and global directors and even Chief Executive/ Operation/ Finance/
Information Officers (CXOs) have access to the data. Occasionally, upon client demand,
the reporting service is accessible to certain clients. As part of marketing research or
brand governance, often some users even have to create a copy of an instance of a data
collection and enhance it with new data, which can be of base type or custom type. The
amount of data an agency creates every hour from all corners of the world is massive and
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it is very hard to predict which form of data will be transferred to the reporting database.
Thus it’s impractical to enforce any schema for it; thus the data warehouse is housed in a
NoSQL database.
Recalling what was discussed in Chapter 3 the current level of security mechanism that
gets shipped with the database package is mainly at the instance level. This means any
user having access to a database instance has complete access to all data. Considering
this, access control in the above reporting service presents a daunting challenge. For
example, clients should not be able to configure a report which may involve other clients’
data or any mission critical information from the agency. Campaign/budget/personal
information report should not be accessed across global, regional and local business
nodes. The reporting service also needs to govern who can create a copy of certain data,
enhance and give further access to it. In contrast with a relational database where
permissions can be set on a schema level and where every user of the database can be
configured with accessible relations, in a NoSQL database the data is very flat. None of
the traditional approaches works for the above example. The unique problems in
designing an access control for the above example are:
-

Grouping data and giving proper access to certain users with appropriate
privileges.

-

Manageability of data growth and dynamic permission set for enhancement of
data.

-

Devising proper context for different parts of a data collection.
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Chapter 5

5

Proposed Solution

Schemaless design makes the access control requirement very complex. The shape of a
collection of data at any given point of time is unpredictable. A global agency enterprise
houses hundreds of users, roles, resources and permissions to model. In an agency there
are a variety of applications that require making complex access control decisions. Let us
suppose, in our reporting example, a ‘Creative’ role cannot access any campaign data
unless that access is authorized by the ‘Product Lead’ leading that campaign. Although
RBAC can make an authorization decision based on a user’s role, it is not flexible enough
to enforce rules that are dependent on any particular state of data. This makes the security
requirements in our reporting example very dynamic and in need of flexible policy
enforcement. Even in the normal case, there are many intricate user-data relationships
that must be managed by the security framework; in addition, the security model should
also accommodate delegation of access to data in mission critical situations. In our
proposed access control model, the policy execution mechanism is highly dynamic and
independent of any particular business model.

5.1 A Context Aware RBAC Model
As we recall in RBAC, a user has a role which is a set of privileges. In a standard
implementation of RBAC, there are implicit subset constraints on objects which are
represented by Privileges. Often these constraints are static and manually programmed
beforehand. For example, in a small business, an employee can only see his/her annual
performance evaluation, a supervisor/manager can only see the performance report for
the employees who directly report to him/her and a department head can see the
performance reports of all the employees in his/her department. At any given time there
is a predictable number of employees and performance reports in a system, thus a
precompiled list of authorized access control policies can establish the proper control
over such a system. Now we overlay structure to our enterprise example. Not only do we
not always know beforehand which objects are to be under access control, the number of
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the objects is also dynamic. This gets more out of hand when compound objects come
into the scene. Standard RBAC will have to store a large number of pre-authorized
lists/policies which would have to be searched every time the system is accessed. This is
not only inefficient but also not scalable. In document based database, data is an
unstructured document. The same data body can be accessed by different users for
different purposes, where access can be partial. In standard RBAC we can introduce
constraints to regulate which roles to be activated at any given time, but it’s not quite
possible to specify the purpose or part of a large object. With the goal to not over
complicate the design principles of NoSQL, what we propose in this study is to introduce
Context to extend a standard RBAC solution.
An overview of the basic concept of the solution is presented in Figure 9. Solid lines
represent relationships among the standard RBAC participants; whereas the dashed lines
introduce the relationship of Context regulating the standard relationships. The given
model is based on the standard RBAC model which is extended with the following three
concepts: Database instances, Data groups and Context. In the proposed model the
definition of the session is taken from the standard RBAC model [10].
Let us first define our terminology. An appropriate definition by A. K. Dey is - "Context
is any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity. An entity is a
person, place, or object that is considered relevant to the interaction between a user and
an application, including the user and applications themselves." [11].
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Figure 9: Basic concept of a Context facilitated RBAC

5.1.1
5.1.1.1

Definition of Model Elements
Data Object (O)

A data object is the smallest unit to be accessed and protected in an application. In a
document database it can be a database instance, data collection or individual fields. A
data collection can consist of simple fields and thus require a simple policy definition, or
the fields can be embedded data objects thus requiring a more intelligent access control
policy.

5.1.1.2

Data Group (G)

A data group is a group of data objects with the same level of security preference. For
instance, all types of business process create similar records called “Report”. Data groups
can be used to combine data objects and create a compound definition of object. Thus
“Regional Report” is a group of data composed of subsidiary objects such as product,
budget, finance, legal, etc.
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5.1.1.3

Data Set (DS)

A data set is the set of all data objects within an application.

5.1.1.4

User (U)

A user set is the set of potential entities that will access the data objects in the data set of
an application; it is analogous to subject in RBAC. Let U be the set of all users in the
system, and S be the set of users’ sessions. The predicate usersSession(u, s) verifies if the
session s (s

S) belongs to the user u (u

U). In the case of RBAC-based models,

assignment of roles to a user can depend on user’s context.

5.1.1.5

Role (R)

A role is a set of relevant set of responsibilities or authorities conceptualized by
participants in an application. Roles can be enabled, disabled or active. A set of roles can
be available to being activated for a given user, while only one role can be activated in
one session. Whether a role will be in the enabled or disabled state depends on the
context condition. Therefore, we define a role as a tuple (Rn , RCtx, State); Rn is the
name of the role and ‘State’ can be disabled, enabled, or active. Here RCtx defines the
context condition for enabling/disabling role Rn for a user in a given session with respect
to which state ‘State’ it is in.

5.1.1.6

Context term (CT)

A context term can be defined as necessary attributes for all the relationships or
operations in an application. In simple cases, a context term may be a concrete property
familiar in everyday life, such as time or location. In a more complex scenario, a context
type can also be used to describe an abstract concept such as interface and other security
identification for single-signon authentication. By analyzing the system security
requirements, application designers determine the context terms for an application. For
example, suppose we have a security requirement that a product designer can only see
reports on current campaigns he/she is directly assigned in or which belong to the same
business unit/interface he/she signs in from. From this requirement, we need a concept to
describe if there is a logical relationship like “current” or “regional” between a user and a
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campaign report. Context terms are pre-defined but system administrators may need to
introduce new contexts. As a document based database accepts query on HTTP
connections through REST, context terms can be defined in Web Service Definition
Language (WSDL) [42].

5.1.1.7

Context expression (CtxExp)

In order to make this abstract concept of context term usable when authorization
decisions are made, we evaluate each context term by some context expression forming
conditions and clauses. A context expression can be presented as a logical expression
(shown below). Based on this format, an access control schema is capable of specifying
any complex context related constraint to describe all kinds of security requirements. The
context expression describes operations to be executed and the conditions under which
these can be executed. We adopt the context expression/condition as a logical expression
which may consist of queries, context functions, logical operators {¬ ;
comparison operators {< ;

; >;

;

;

; ∨} and

} [25]

Context Expression: =Clause1 ∨ Clause2 …∨ Clausei
Clause: = Condition1 Condition2 … Conditionj
Condition: = <CT> <OP> <VALUE>, where OP is a logical operator in the set {>, , <, , ≠, }
and this set can be extended to accommodate user-defined operators as well; VALUE is a specific
value of CT.

The context expressions are essentially conditions for the assignment relations (a proper
assignment relation will be established if the assigned context condition is satisfied) and
for role definitions in order to enable/disable roles. Let us suppose, we have a security
rule such that in an advertisement agency, a campaign report can be accessed when the
logical location of the campaign and the user requesting access is same or the user is an
agency user (can be defined as function ‘user belongs to the team’) and the campaign
status is not archived (can be defined as function ‘status of campaign is not archived’).
For this security policy, the context expression can be presented as follows:
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Context Expression: = (Region (User) = Region (Campaign)) ∨ (IsRunning(Campaign)
User Team(Campaign))
IsRunning: = Status (Campaign)! = ‘Archived’
Team: = Personnel (Campaign)

Figure 10: Example of Context Expression

5.1.2
5.1.2.1

Relation Assignments
User - Role Assignment

In a standard RBAC user role assignment is static. In our proposed solution, a static
assignment can be defined as the predicate sRoleAssign(r, u, ctx); assignment of the role
r to the user u is possible if the context ctx is evaluated as true. But systems that are
hosted in a NoSQL database enjoy the ability to grow without predefined implicit schema
and it is necessary to assign certain roles only to the users who match certain context.
In the case of such a scenario, system administrators can add new roles and privileges for
newly added data objects without being concerned who will access it. This approach is
then can be defined as dynamic role creation for the dynamic data growth. Suppose, in
the reporting system, the campaign collection gets a new mission critical field. System
administrators just need to create a new role accompanied with a role assignment context
expression and its member privileges.
The predicate roleCondAssign(r, roleCtx) defines the role assignment constraint roleCtx
that must be satisfied, to assign the role r to a user. This condition (roleCtx) may contain
any context data to match with the user context or the operation context. This way a userrole assignment for unstructured data growth can be supported without compromising
security and without much need of system maintenance. This can be expressed as:
dRoleAssign(r) ⇐ roleContextAssign(r, roleCtx)

evalContext(roleCtx, u)
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If the predicate dRoleAssign(r) is satisfied against the current user’s context whose roles
are loaded, the role r can be activated for the user in the current session.

5.1.2.2

Role - Role Assignment

The role hierarchy (RH) is defined as a partial order over the set of roles R (RH ⊆ R ×R)
[9], i.e. as an inheritance relation, marked as ≽, where r1 ≽ r2 means r1 inherits r2. A user
u can activate a new role rj only when rj is predecessor of the roles already activated for
the user. A formal definition of role assignment in the presence of hierarchy is:
canObtainRole(u, rj) := isRoleAssigned(u , rj) ∨ ((ri ≽ rj) ∧ canObtainRole(u , ri))

5.1.2.3

Privilege assignment/authorization

In a document database, a collection can contain basic type fields, reference type fields or
fields containing an embedded document. Thus like roles, data objects can also be
hierarchically organized.
Privileges can be associated with a database instance or a group of collections (data
group) or a document or set of certain fields in a collection. A Privilege defined for a
group applies to all its collections, documents and fields. The object privilege can be
defined as: po = (o, op); o
op); g

G; op

O; op

Op, while the group privilege is defined as: pg = (g,

Op. So P can be defined as po ∪ pg.

In case of an embedded document or field containing a reference to another data object,
the privilege assignment becomes a little complicated. When a document contains
another document within, a user’s current privilege can extend to an additional required
privilege only if both the collections are part of the same data group or only if their
associated contexts are satisfied in case of a compound operation.
We can formulate the logical definition as –
The privilege pi can be extended by the permission pj if:
– pi and pj are defined for the same operation and data group, or
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– pi and pj are defined for data objects which are contextually related.

5.1.3

Access definition

We define an access request REQ as <U, O, OP, RTC>; U is an authorized user who
initiates the request, O is the data object user wants to access, OP is the operation that
needs to be performed, RTC is the set of contexts available in current user session. The
access control mechanism makes use of an Access Control policy as a triple, ACP = (S,
P, C); S is the subject in this policy, which could be a user or a role with a context
attribute; P is the target privilege in this policy, which is defined as a <OP, O>, where OP
is an operation defined as {READ, CREATE, APPEND, DELETE, UPDATE}, O is a
data object or data group; C is a context expression in this policy.
REQ is granted only if there exists an authorization policy ACP (S, P, C), such that U
S, OP on O can be implied from p

P and C evaluates to true with RTC. We consider the

normal administrative user-role and role-permission assignments by security
administrators.
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5.1.4

Context Evaluation

In this section we define the algorithm for evaluating context supporting the schema
discussed in the previous section.
RequestAccess (U , O , OP, RTC)
initialize candidate policy set PS = {}
for every ACP in policy set of the application
if (U S in ACP) and (O , OP) ⇐ P in ACP)
put ACP into PS
end if
end for
initialize result = “deny”
if RTC = null Call Basic RBAC
else
for every ACP in PS
if (EvaluateExpression (C in ACP, RTC) is true)
result = “grant”
break
else
result = “deny”
end if
end for
return result
EvaluateExpression(ContextExpression Exp, RuntimeContext RTC)
for every clause CL in Exp
for every condition CD in CL
evaluate context expression in CD with RTC
if (CD = false)
CL = false
break
end if
end for
if (CL = true) return true
else continue
end for
return false
The central concept in the above two algorithms is to evaluate a context condition at
runtime. We define a context implementation as a service call. There are several ways to
implement contexts which can be dynamically evaluated such as with a dynamic link
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library or a web service, both of which support dynamic invocation at runtime. In our
solution, we model all the required contexts evaluation as web services to facilitate
extensibility and interoperability.
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Chapter 6
Solution verification/evaluation

6

We have discussed one way to extend a standard RBAC with the help of Context. This
approach has been used in complex business processes and workflow systems. But the
schema we discussed in the previous section has been minimized to maintain flexibility
and simplicity in NoSQL and the Context concept has been designed to run seamlessly
with the design principles of document databases. In this section we will evaluate the
proposed schema against the example given in Chapter 4 Section 4.
We define several collections in the database, contexts and a role hierarchy for our
example scenario. Let us name the collections in the system as:
- Campaign
- Product
- Finance
- Operations
Users can request reports from the reporting service. In our example the objects which
must have an access control policy regulated are:
-

Campaign Report (Derived mainly from “campaign” collection)

-

Product Backlog (Derived from “product” collection)

-

Audit Report (Derived mainly from “finance” and “operations” collection)

We can define a document in the ‘Campaign’ collection as presented in Figure 11.
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Campaign =
{
_id: { "$oid" : "528e00cfcc93743934048747" },
clientId: { "$oid" : "528e011fcc93743938528560" },
name: { “Holiday Deals” },
productLine: {
[{specline:”S1”, “price”:435},
{specline:”S2”, “price”:133}],
rebate: 879},
promoProductLine: { "$oid" : "528e011fcc93743934048748" },
marcomm: {
region: { "$oid" : "528e011fcc93743934048800" },
quarter: “Q1”,
deadline: ISODate("2012-10-10T14:00:00Z"),
reviewer: [{ "$oid" : "528e011fcc93743934048800" }
, { "$oid" : "528e011fcc93743934048705" }
, { "$oid" : "528e011fcc93743934048963" }],
reviews : [ {
reviewer:”….”,
issues:”………………….”,
Internal_suggestions:”….”,
date :”…..”},
{reviewer:”….”,
issues:”………………….”,
Internal_suggestions:”….”,
date :”…..”}],
approval: { by: ,on: } },
status: {
stage: {name:”live”, division:”Marketing”},
lastmodifiedon: new Date(“Jul 17, 2013”),
lastmodifiedby :{name:{last:”…”, first:”...”}},
nextstage: {name:”EOL”, division:”Briefing”} },
operation: { manager: { "$oid" : "528e011fcc93743934044569" },
members: [{ "$oid" : "528e011fcc93743934042287" }
, { "$oid" : "528e011fcc56743934078452" }
, { "$oid" : "528e011fcc56743934048711" }] },
finance: {budget:9876, opcost:9871, profit:10},
lastAccess: {on: ISODate("2013-11-22T09:30:00Z"), by: {"$oid" :
"528e011fcc94743934048844" }}, IsArchived:false
}

Figure 11: "Campaing" Collection

A sample hierarchy of roles in the system at any given point of time is depicted in Figure
12. We have “visitor” as minimum role and “Chief Information Officer (CIO)” as
maximum role in our example role graph [21]. Roles “Product Lead” and “Global
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Finance” have privileges that are are mutually exclusive with authorizationtime/complete exclusion restriction. “Operations Lead” is a role that has runtime/shared
exclusion (denoted by dashed relations) with each of the roles “Reviewer” and “Regional
Finance”, where access control rule employs the least privilege principle.

Figure 12: Sample Role Hierarchy with min, max and mutually exclusive
We refer to Figure 13 to explain the access control with respect to the data model and
operation flow. The ovals represent the reports the system produces and the rectangles
represent the different data objects/groups available in the system. Figure 13 gives us a
snapshot of a regional (context: location) data composition. We can see that a campaign
report consists of product, operations and finance information; these rectangles in Figure
13 are demonstrated as embedded fields or reference fields in Figure 11. We can derive a
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use case from this as when a user has privilege to read a campaign report, he/she may not
have a sufficient set of privileges to read a complete campaign because of mutually
exclusive roles for accessing financial or operations fields. In an agency a user can have
access to all fields of a campaign document but he/she may not be able read all the
documents in the campaign collection if the campaign documents do not belong to the
same logical location as the user. To access all campaign documents, a user has to have
the role “Product Lead” or higher activated in his/her session.

Figure 13: Sample data composition
A Campaign report requires users to have different types of privileges to perform
different operations. A user with product lead role can create a campaign report or
product backlog, which also implies when this role is activated the user will have the full
set of privileges on either reports through its junior roles. But in case of users having
roles junior to “Product lead” activated, they may need dynamic role activation
depending on the state/context of a campaign document. For example, a user session
containing the update privilege for a campaign may need to activate update privileges on
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the product backlog if a particular campaign document has the fields referring to product
backlog.

Figure 14: Available privileges on Campaign and Product data
Figure 14 illustrates the different privileges providing different access to these two
reports. The Product Lead role has the privilege to create and the Creative role has
“append” privilege on product backlogs. Since both of these roles are senior roles of
“Digital Designer”, both of these roles also have the update, read, and delete permissions
on campaign. But a “Digital Designer” role can only have update privileges on campaign
report.
One special scenario on access will be that a visitor may get read privilege to agency
information of a campaign document if the context of the visitor and the context of the
client of the campaign match.
These use-case scenarios demonstrate the purpose of extending RBAC with the notion of
context. It represents the cases when certain roles are dynamically assigned to users based
on the information contained in documents in a collection. Also, these roles will have the

57

permissions to execute certain operations only for the specific instances depending on
users who acquire these roles.
For the purpose of providing an example we only consider context of the user and context
of the data in the context service. The user session contains the logical location of a user
as “Region” and the authentication context (Agency, External, Client, etc.), whereas the
context for data is multifaceted. Data objects also have the same context terms as users
for location, as well as its status, type and sensitivity. The contexts can be evaluated as
values or conditions through a context. We show an example set of contexts in Figure 15.
Status, Location, Type and Sensitivity are context terms (CT) that can be used in context
expressions. Status can have values of ‘Archived’ or ‘EOL’ which are of lowest security
level. Status can have values of ‘InPlanning’, ‘InReview’, ‘MarcommApproved’ or
‘Live’; each one is less significant in terms of security than the one following it, thus a
context expression for status can be formed with comparison operators. Status and
sensitivity represent the state of a campaign document in our example. Location is a
logical segregation of business units and campaigns. Users and campaigns are grouped
according to the location context to form the same access level data group. A type is a
context which is applied to the users of the system.
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Status:= Archived || EOL < InPlanning < InReview < MarcommApproved |
LegalApproved < Live
Location:= Global > Nordic | (Asia-Pacific-Japan) APJ | Americas | Benelux
Type:= Agency > ExternalAgency > Client > General
Sensitivity:=
0 – Campaigns of 12 month or more old and with non-reference fields |
Campaigns with “Archived” Status
1 – Campaigns of previous quarter | Budget/Operations reports from
Campaigns with “Archived” Status | Product Backlog of all campaigns with status
higher than “InPlanning”
2 – Campaigns with status higher than or equal “InReview” Personnel
attributes | Campaigns with Reviews/Approvals
3 – Campaigns with status “Live” with relevant finance attributes
Figure 15: Example set of contexts for a global agency

6.1 Access control enforcement
The information architecture of our example agency can be roughly translated to a set of
rules. These rules regulate the data access in the system. We formulate a number of rules
from the scenarios mentioned in the previous section.
Rule 1: Visitors can only view campaigns that ran over a year ago. They cannot see any
agency internal information. They may get access to their own campaigns minus its
‘marcomm’ fields if they are clients.
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Rule 2: Digital Designers and executives can read, delete and update respectively
campaign reports and audit reports of his/her location. Digital Designer can read the
product backlog for their location.
Rule 3: Campaign reports and the product backlog can be appended (implies update,
delete) to by the creative role for the location of the user.
Rule 4: Reviewers can only append Campaign reports for their location.
Rule 5: Campaign and audit data can be appended to by members of the Legal role in
their own location.
Rule 6: Product lead is the only role which can create (imply append) new campaign
reports and product backlog.
Rule 7: Operations lead role can create new audit report and access finance. But an
Operations Exec member can append operation information.
Rule 8: Finance information in campaign and audit reports can be appended to by
Regional Finance within their location whereas only a Global Finance user can append
regardless of which location the campaign or audit is for.
A security infrastructure can be modeled taking the use case scenarios and these rules
into consideration. This infrastructure can be seen as a means of access control for any
application using the document database. The process of access control enforcement is
the heart of the security infrastructure which can be performed through three steps:
– Evaluation of context for the subject and the requested object to determine the required
privilege set (described in Figure 16).
– Role Activation (described in Figure 17).
– Verification and execution of the requested operation; that the operation is permitted in
the current session under respective contexts (described in Figure 18).
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The first two steps calculate required permission and activate the appropriate role
independently using the corresponding context. The 3rd step takes the outputs of the first
two steps and verifies if the user with the activated role contains the privilege to access
the requested object. We can model these three steps as functions calls.

Function CreatePrivilegeList(Object obj, Operation op, RuntimeContext RTC) :
Privilege
begin
OC:= ObjectContext(obj, op)
OPC:= CalculateOperationalContext( OC, RTC)
Prv:= PrivilegeRequired(obj, op)
Privilege: = CalculatePrivilegeList(Prv , OPC)
Return
end
Figure 16: Function call for privilege list
The function in Figure 16 evaluates the requestor and resource context to create a
dynamic session/operational context. This session context is then used to filter the
required set of privileges that needs to be available for the requestor during the execution
of the access request.

Function ActivateRoles(User u, RuntimeContext RTC) : Void
begin
UR:= UserRoles(u)
For each r UR do
Evaluate rctx against RTC and state in r to enable or disable r
if isEnabled (r) is true then
ActivateRoleInSession (r)
Return
end
Figure 17: Function call for role activation

61

Function InitializeRequest (User u, Object obj, Operation op, RuntimeContext RTC):
Void
Begin
P: = CreatePrivilegeList( Object obj, Operarion op, RuntimeContext RTC)
ActivateRoles (u, RTC)
Initialize R with Session Roles
Initialize RP
RP:= AssociatedRoles(P)
Excl: = CheckMutualExclusion(R, RP)
Case: Excl is “no exclusion”
ROP:= Intersect( R, RP)
Execute operation as ROP //request granted for role ROP
Case: Excl is “Shared”
For each r

R do

if P is not associated with r then
Check for least privilege constraint
If satisfies then
Assign(p, r)
Execute operation as r //request granted for role r
Else
Throw UnauthorizedAccessRequestException
//request denied
Case: Excl is “Complete”
Throw UnauthorizedAccessRequestException //request denied
End
Figure 18: Function call verifying request
The first step in Figure 17 is to load the roles assigned to the user, and then, from the set
of the loaded roles, it evaluates role context for each role and enables/disables the role
accordingly. Basically this means that the context expression is evaluated against runtime
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context values to change the state of each role. Depending on the context an enabled role
can be turned disabled or a disabled role can be enabled. The algorithm for the activation
of roles can be changed in order to meet the requirements of different systems. The above
function simplifies role activation where all the enabled roles assigned to the user are
activated.
The last step in Figure 18 combines results of the above two calls and does a final
verification of the request. The subject can access the object if the permission that allows
the particular type of access is contained in the permission authorized in the subject’s
role. This function takes the privilege list and the roles in the session. Then it checks if
the roles activated for the user and the roles associated with the required privileges have
any mutual exclusion in terms of roles and permissions both. If there is no exclusion
present, then it gets the common set of roles and executes the request on behalf of the
role. The intersection of role sets may be empty; in that case the execution routine throws
an exception. If there is a shared exclusion, implying that the roles are defined as shared
or the privileges associated with each of the set of roles can be associated with the other
one only if they satisfy a least privilege restriction defined by the security administrator;
this is the runtime/shared mutual exclusion [16]. The request is denied if there is any
authorization time complete exclusion defined for the roles in the current session.

Let us take an example request which a random visitor initiates- <”Sam”, “Campaign”,
“find name”, [“APJ”,”Non-client”]>
The high level execution steps for this request according to the rule 1 from Section 6.1
are as follows:
1. Find roles for “Sam”; [{“visitor”,”location = global”,active}]
2. Create list of privileges for finding names of available campaigns.
2.1. Object context for finding name of Campaign: [campaign.marcomm.region =
RTC→location] and [campaign.status.stage <for> RTC→userStatus] or [...]
(<for> is a user-defined function)
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2.2. Evaluate context: [campaign.marcomm.region
campaign.status.stage

“APJ” and

“Archieved”]

2.3. Privilege required: [“read-archived”, “read-basic”, ”read-all”, ”read-product”,
”read-marcomm”,”…”]
2.4. Calculate privilege list for current session: [“read- archived”]
3. Available roles containing “read- archived” privilege: [{“visitor”, ”location = global”,
enabled},[{“visitor”, ”location = APJ”, enabled}] (inherited by all other roles in
‘Global’ and ‘APJ’ context)
4. Roles in step 1 and 3 are not mutually exclusive and intersect is not empty so the
request gets executed.
We will discuss one more use-case when an agency user initiates a request as:
<”Aaron”, “Campaign”, “Update price for spec S1”, [“Benelux”,”Agency”,"sesitivity:
2"]>
The high level execution steps for this request according to the rules from Section 6.1 are
as follows:
1. Find roles for “Aaron”; [{“Operations Lead”,”location = Benelux",Active},
{“Legal”,”location

Nordic",disabled},{“Reviewer”,”location

Global",Active}]

2. Create list of privileges for updating price for product in campaign.
2.1. Object context for update in product in campaign: [campaign.marcomm.region =
RTC→location] and [status.stage < live] or [sensitivity<= 2 ]
2.2. Evaluate context: [campaign.marcomm.region

“Benelux” and sensitivity< 2 is

true]
2.3. Privilege required: [“read-product”, ”update-campaign”, "read-finance"]
3. Available roles containing either of the [“read-product”, ”update-campaign”, "readfinance] privileges: [{“Digital Designer”, ”location
enabled},{“Reviewer”, ”location
”location

Benelux”,

Benelux”, enabled}, {“Regional Finance”,

Benelux”, enabled}] (according to rule 3 and 8)

4. Roles “Operations Lead” and “Regional Finance” have shared mutual exclusion in
terms of privilege.
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4.1. Role intersection doesn’t occur.
4.2. {“Regional Finance”,”location

Benelux”, enabled} role can be assigned to

“Aaron” after checking least privilege restriction e.g. “Aaron” cannot have all the
privileges to append finance information and change a legal (inherited from
Legal role which is junior to Operations Lead) approval in the same session.
5. The request is granted
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Chapter 7

7

Conclusions and Future Work

The model presented in this thesis acts as an extension of RBAC [10]. Even though
context sensitivity has been suggested as an entity in security frameworks for web
architectures, one might debate the use of recent developments in access control. The
main drawback in RBAC is the inadequate role granularity for fine-grained authorization
which leads to role explosion. Role administration gets exponentially complex for
precise and fine grained user-role and role-permission assignment. Eventually the number
of extensions to the core RBAC models increases to allow provision for situational
factors e.g. time, location, task etc. [15, 17, 27].

7.1 Discussion and Conclusions
Intuitively, an attribute is a property in data that can be viewed as context. Sandhu [27]
defined attributes as security labels, clearances and classifications (LBAC), identities and
access control lists (DAC) and roles (RBAC). He claims that attribute based access
control (ABAC) compliments RBAC by making provision for additional attributes such
as location, time of day, strength of authentication, departmental affiliation, qualification,
frequent flyer status, and so on into the framework. This endorsement of attributes in
access control seems to be a good fit for NoSQL where a security level changes on the
same data object depending on the elements it consists of at run time. An attribute based
security policy may work better with environmental contexts when a cloud service model
or workflow is considered; but NoSQL and its nonconformance of structure inside a data
object presents unlimited combination of attributes leading to the same role or permission
explosion as with the basic RBAC. Sandhu [27] cautions in his paper that ABAC with its
flexibility may further confound the problem of role design and engineering. With this we
can conclude that when NoSQL is of concern a context sensitive RBAC provides
flexible, dynamic and light weight security without creating more complex framework
which is the design principle for any NoSQL supporting application.
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Most of the popular NoSQL package gets shipped with coarse-grained security
mechanism. To mitigate the security concerns raised by the lack of proper access control,
we opted for a model which dynamically allows and restricts access to inherently
complex data objects. Beside basic privacy ensured by RBAC, our model has been
evaluated to support dynamic assignment of roles to users and dynamic assignment of
permissions to roles depending on run-time contexts. This access control depends on
different context factors, which vary with the data it protects. In this thesis we present a
context based access control model that supports these requirements.
Lacking the structure of RDBMS, NoSQL adopts an open principle when it comes to
designing an application. This results in access control for such applications varying
depending on different unpredictable factors. A possible solution for this problem is to
adopt a forward looking security concept, for example context of data, operations and
users. The context is used to handle access control requirements which evolve as the
nature of data change over the course of time.
The dynamic context based access control model discussed in this thesis extends the
traditional RBAC model and gains advantages from its context sensitive parameter. Our
research motivation comes from the complicated access control requirements inherent to
schemalessness of NoSQL database. Traditional RBAC is not able to guarantee a
sufficiently fine-grained access control or specify constraints that should be applied to an
access policy for non-structured data. We incorporated the support for context-sensitive
RBAC to introduce access control and contribute towards a much needed privacy
framework in the relatively new NoSQL database.

7.2 Future Work
The main focus of our model is to ensure access control and we discussed how it is
applied in a single application. But web applications today are highly collaborative and
thus the provision for access control to address security issues raised by service to service
communication also need to be taken into account. With our model, most context types
can be implemented as web services located within the enterprise, but there are use cases
where a third party outside a system perimeter may need to configure contexts. In our
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future version of model we plan to incorporate mechanism to address context-sensitivity
when the requestor is a service outside the system by extending single domain RBAC to
multi domain. An external service request needs to acquire proper membership in the
authorization process. We plan to utilize WS-SecureConversation; a Web Services
specification, created by IBM and others, that works in conjunction with WS-Security,
WS-Trust and WS-Policy to allow the creation and sharing of security contexts [44] to
evaluate the aforementioned requirements.
NoSQL databases provide good admin-level security for their replication sets and autosharding. Because of that, the model discussed in this thesis doesn’t have the provision
for context sensitivity for the sharding or replication concept. But it needs to be addressed
in its future version, as without providing secure and detailed control on data growth, any
access control model for NoSQL is not complete. Our initial model ensures security for
data in storage not the growth itself.
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Appendices
Appendix A: SQL to MongoDB Mapping Chart
Table 5: Terminology and Concepts [43]
SQL Terms/Concepts

MongoDB Terms/Concepts

database

database

table

collection

row

document or BSON document

column

field

index

index

table joins

embedded documents and linking

primary key
Specify any unique column or column
combination as primary key.

primary key
In MongoDB, the primary key is
automatically set to the _id field.

aggregation (e.g. group by)

aggregation pipeline

Table 6: DDL Query [43]
SQL Schema Statements
CREATE TABLE users (
id MEDIUMINT NOT
NULL
AUTO_INCREMENT,
user_id Varchar(30),
age Number,
status char(1),
PRIMARY KEY (id)
)

MongoDB Schema Statements
db.createCollection("users")
or
db.users.insert( {
user_id: "abc123",
age: 55,
status: "A"
})

ALTER TABLE users
ADD join_date DATETIME

db.users.update(
{ },
{ $set: { join_date: new Date() } },
{ multi: true }
)

ALTER TABLE users
DROP COLUMN join_date

Collections do not describe or enforce the structure of

74

SQL Schema Statements

MongoDB Schema Statements
its documents; Still one can use $unset –
db.users.update(
{ },
{ $unset: { join_date: "" } },
{ multi: true }
)

CREATE INDEX
idx_user_id_asc
ON users(user_id)

db.users.ensureIndex( { user_id: 1 } )

CREATE INDEX
idx_user_id_asc_age_desc
ON users(user_id, age DESC)
DROP TABLE users

db.users.ensureIndex( { user_id: 1, age: -1 } )
db.users.drop()

Table 7: DML Query [43]
SQL SELECT Statements

MongoDB find() Statements

SELECT *
FROM users

db.users.find()

SELECT id, user_id, status
FROM users

db.users.find(
{ },
{ user_id: 1, status: 1 }
)

SELECT user_id, status
FROM users

db.users.find(
{ },
{ user_id: 1, status: 1, _id: 0 }
)

SELECT *
FROM users
WHERE status = "A"

db.users.find(
{ status: "A" }
)

SELECT user_id, status
FROM users
WHERE status = "A"

db.users.find(
{ status: "A" },
{ user_id: 1, status: 1, _id: 0 }
)
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SQL SELECT Statements

MongoDB find() Statements

SELECT *
FROM users
WHERE status != "A"

db.users.find(
{ status: { $ne: "A" } }
)

SELECT *
FROM users
WHERE status = "A"
AND age = 50

db.users.find(
{ status: "A",
age: 50 }
)

SELECT *
FROM users
WHERE status = "A"
OR age = 50

db.users.find(
{ $or: [ { status: "A" } ,
{ age: 50 } ] }
)
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